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Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, even now, remains a deeply puzzling figure for scholars 
and commentators concerned with matters Indonesian, Western and Indonesian alike.  
For much of his long career in Indonesian politics and administration he was derided 
as a somewhat eccentric figure, best known for his expensive, heavily-promoted 
aircraft production projects, his idiosyncratic views of the economics of development, 
his controversial role in Indonesia’s purchase of the greater part of the former East 
German navy, his capacity to speak at great length and with great rapidity and 
intensity on any subject dear to his heart and, one journalist commented, “his tone, his 
high-pitched voice, his exaggerated gestures”.1 
 
Eccentric he was, but in the proper sense of the word, that is, not common, irregular, 
marked with a singularity of behaviour.  He was not cut from the usual pattern of 
Indonesian political characters for whom politics and its practice are all-consuming 
and who feed remorselessly upon the excitement, dangers, and intrigue of the political 
game.  Born in relative prosperity and local prominence to a Buginese father and a 
Javanese mother in Pare-Pare, South Sulawesi, in 1936, he was the fourth of nine 
children.  From his earliest days he was fascinated with mechanics, process, and 
systems; he told me in a 2005 interview in Munich of his love of his Meccano set, and 
how endlessly he played with it.  His mother was sufficiently resourced and 
resourceful to send the studious and serious youngster to Bandung for a good higher 
school education.  Soon thereafter he left the country of his birth to pursue his 
education and seek a career with that burning ambition, single-mindedness, even 
obsessiveness, that was to become his hallmark.  He obtained his engineering degree 
in 1960 from the Rheinisch Westfalische Technische Hochschule, Aachen, and his 
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PhD, summa cum laude, in 1965, in the field of aircraft design and construction.  He 
then proceeded to carve out a highly successful career in aeronautical engineering and 
management with Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm in Germany, rising to the position 
of Vice President and Director for Technology Application.  While he professed to me 
that he had wanted to return to Indonesia around 1966, all the signs indicate that he 
intended to continue his burgeoning career in Germany indefinitely.  At the same 
time, he knew that senior Indonesian eyes were upon him.  He had, of course, 
famously made an acquaintance with Suharto in Makasar in 1950, when the young 
Javanese lieutenant-colonial, leading a brigade there in the wake of the Andi Azis 
affair,2 had interceded at the time of the sudden death of Habibie’s father.3  
Subsequently, Habibie had met privately with Suharto in 1961 in Bonn, when Suharto 
had accompanied Nasution to Europe on an arms procurement mission.  But it was 
not until late 1973, through the intermediary of Ibnu Sutowo, that Suharto requested 
Habibie’s return to Indonesia to assist in the task of economic “take-off” and 
specifically to address the enhancement of Indonesia’s technology capacity.  Habibie 
admitted to me that at that time he had never heard of the word “take-off” before that 
time—except in relation to aircraft.  He also knew little or nothing of Indonesia’s 
domestic politics and personalities.  Indeed, he had never even heard of Golkar;  when 
Indonesians were talking of this government-backed electoral vehicle, he thought that 
they were saying “go-kart”!  Nor did he have any interest in local politics, although he 
claims to have established  a local group in Germany opposed to the communists. 
 
So, from the start, Habibie was a political outsider, both in terms of his interest in 
politics and in the trajectory of his career.  His political power and influence was seen 
purely as a function of Suharto’s special patronage, which allowed him the space, 
power and funds to develop his vision of technological advance for Indonesia in ways 
that observers often saw as indulgent, wasteful and wrong-headed.  His economic 
ideas, sometimes derisively labelled as “Habibie-nomics” and which formed the 
foundation of his technological vision, differed sharply from those of the neo-liberal 
technocrats upon whom Suharto was wont to rely for policy advice, especially at 
times of economic crisis.  Not for him the well-trodden recourse to the economics of 
short-term comparative advantage in such things as rice production and cheap labour 
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industries since, he argued, their very success sooner or later necessarily removed that 
comparative edge.  For him, “comparative advantage only worked in places which 
didn’t want modern means of communication and modern development”.4  During my 
two days of interview with Habibie early in 2005, the only time he showed a flash of 
real anger, impatience and irritation was when I asked him about his relations with the 
technocrats.  The technocrats, he spat, didn’t even want Indonesia to have universities, 
and he was similarly dismissive of technocrat opposition to the development of the 
PALAPA satellite system which linked together the distant parts of the far-flung 
Indonesian archipelago.  Rather than comparative advantage, he spoke of 
“competitive advantage”; his idea was that he would develop Indonesian 
technological capacity as a means of showing that Indonesians had the ability to 
perform difficult technological feats at high levels of excellence, develop their sense 
of belief in self and self-confidence, and provide the wherewithal for much enhanced 
value-adding.  Competitive advantage, he reasoned, could best be achieved and 
exemplified through the difficult task of developing an airplane, and would pave the 
way for a more permanent and lasting economic uplift than the modest, short-lived 
fruits promised by the economics of comparative advantage. 
 
On the purely political plane, Habibie lacked the skills, patience, malleability, 
elasticity, ruthlessness and self-serving purpose of the true politician.  The aircraft 
industry he developed in Bandung, whatever the technical and administrative skills its 
emergence embodied, was a result of Suharto’s unfailing political support together 
with the generous injections of state funding Habibie received.  His long career as 
Minister of Research and Technology was a consequence of his education and his 
technical and management capacities, not his political skills.  Even his position as the 
inaugural head of ICMI was a consequence of Suharto’s broader scheming and the 
pressure exercised by a group of students from below; he was most reluctant to take 
on the position because of the multitude of his other commitments but, he remarked, 
Suharto was “very very clever in persuading people to do what he wanted”.5  His 
election as Vice-President in 1998 was not the result of political ambition as such, nor 
the result of any long-term scheming or political sleight-of-hand, but was viewed by 
many simply as Suharto’s insurance policy against any move to displace him as 
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president during the 1998-2003 term.  Habibie himself had no independent political 
base, was not seen as politically ambitious, and had no reputation as a back-room 
political manipulator.  He was, in a strange sense, apolitical and politically marginal; 
few saw him as a potential political leader of independent substance.  Whatever 
Habibie’s virtues as engineer, manager and administrator, no one took him seriously 
as a political operator in the hurly-burly of Indonesian politics.  He was viewed as 
Suharto’s creation and protégé, the compliant, sometime sycophantic lap-dog of one 
of the most viscerally brilliant politicians of our age, a man whom Habibie himself 
had reportedly labelled as “Super Genius Suharto” and as his great teacher.6 
 
And then suddenly, on 21 May 1998, Habibie was raised to the highest post in the 
land at a time of the greatest political and economic crisis and tension, a defining 
moment in modern Indonesian history.  Many thought his presidency the last 
desperate whimper of the dying authoritarian regime of the New Order, some 
encouraged him to stand aside immediately in the interests of accommodating popular 
aspirations for reformasi, others again thought he could not last long,7 and some even 
challenged the legality and legitimacy of the dramatic transfer of power of that fateful 
morning.8  The BBC’s Jonathan Head opined that “Habibie owes his rise to power 
entirely to his close friendship with former President Suharto”.9  Another observer 
thought Habibie’s rapidly assembled new Cabinet “by no means revolutionary or even 
strongly reformist in policy terms.  It remains a New Order creation”.10  Few thought 
he could survive politically, much less thrive. 
 
In the event, as we now know, Habibie lasted in the presidency for an extraordinary, 
tumultuous, but ultimately salvific seventeen months, a period which utterly and 
unexpectedly transformed Indonesia and many of its key institutions and positioned it 
for a new, if not entirely unproblematic, stage in its development.  To the 
astonishment of just about everyone, the space of his presidency saw the release of 
political prisoners, the establishment of independent leadership for the national bank, 
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the revocation of the notorious 1963 anti-subversion law, the birth of a host of new 
and free political parties, the “desacralising” (as Habibie put it) of the presidency,11 
the freeing of the press, the granting of the freedom to associate and to promote new 
kinds of thinking, the drafting of new electoral laws that saw the holding of 
Indonesia’s first free and fair elections since 1955, the separation of the armed forces 
from the police and the reduction in the political and bureaucratic influence of the 
armed forces, the creation of the means for East Timor to move on a path towards its 
eventual independence, the efforts to press toward solutions for the problems of Aceh 
and Irian Jaya, the beginnings of the first steps to amend the hitherto unchangeable 
Constitution of 1945, and the granting of the first significant degree of regional 
autonomy in the history of the Republic. 
 
As those times move further into the past, the scale and scope of Habibie’s 
achievement seems ever more astounding and surprising.  How was it that an 
administrative technologist with weak political skills and almost no political support 
could change Indonesia so rapidly, decisively and fundamentally, and in ways that no 
one could have expected? 
 
In my view, a large part of the answer to this problem lies in the peculiar, yes, 
eccentric, personal make-up of this leader who achieved so much in so short a time.  
The recently published memoirs of his presidency allow us to gather key insights into 
the man and his methods.  The Habibie we find in these pages is no politician, no 
political operator.  The practice of politics for him is a duty and a task, to be 
employed for good social purposes, of course, but essentially to be endured; “for me, 
becoming president is not everything in life”.12  He was and remained first of all an 
engineer, a technical manager.  He reveals to us over and again in those memoirs, in 
the context of the cauldron of Indonesian politics in the period 1998-99, the classic 
modus operandi of his chosen profession of engineering:  the neat clarification and 
isolation of a specific problem, the capacity to contextualise that problem within an 
interrelated, interconnected set of other, often broader and larger, technical problems, 
the ingenuity to envisage a systematic and appropriate scheme or plan to attack that 
problem, in all its associated details, and to carry that plan forward with a ruthless 
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12  Ibid., p. 166.  See also pp. 312-13. 
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inner logic, all the while aware that success will always be proximate and limited, 
never perfect.13  Confronted with a problem, Habibie characteristically employed a 
dot-point approach—beautifully exemplified in his memoirs where he summarises 
key points of challenge in his political and administrative career14—which allows him 
to isolate and clarify key variables, contextualise them, and plot a path towards a 
solution to the relevant problem. 
 
In all of this there is little sense of the uncertain and changing political dimensions of 
implementing and sustaining change;  politics, for Habibie, remained a matter of 
technical management.  I gained some small insight into Habibie’s understanding of 
politics when I interviewed him at length in Munich.  Two things struck (and 
surprised) me almost immediately.  The first was that, even though he knew I was 
coming to interview him about political matters, he spend the first half-hour and more 
of our interview explaining the technical problems of stress cracks in aircraft frames 
(journalists had earlier often referred to him as “Mr Crack from Pare-Pare”).  The 
problem of airframe cracking, he assured me, was a finite technical and theoretical 
challenge, soluble by the employment of mathematics, physics, and logic.  It was not 
a matter of experimentation, of repeated testing and review, but of appreciating the 
theoretical dimensions of the problem in its wholeness and developing an 
appropriately theoretical response.  I was, by the way, relieved to be assured that there 
was no prospect of the Airbus 380 falling from the sky because of structural failure.  
The second thing that impressed me was his apparently inordinate pride in his 
position as Executive Coordinator of the Big Family of Golkar (Koordinator Harian 
Keluarga Besar Golkar), a role he carried out for two terms (1993, 1998), the second 
of which he performed without the assistance of a substitute, and which he viewed as 
a badge of honour and of Suharto’s confidence in him.15  I had long associated 
Habibie with a plethora of official positions, but had heard nothing much of this role 
at all.  But then I began to realise that this role was one of management, planning and 
logistics (including the smooth working of the MPR session and the provision of 
assistance to the President in the task of composing a new cabinet), the things closest 
and dearest to Habibie’s heart.  Here he was happiest—personally managing a 
                                                 
13  Interestingly, Habibie’s sense of religious belief is strongly integrated with these values, including a sense of awe and 
gratitude at the technological and social achievements of the West and the desire to learn from Western practice; thus his 
notion of a “religious civil society” (Hasyim, “Presiden Republik Indonesia B.J. Habibie”, p. 16). 
14  Habibie, Detik-detik yang menentukan, pp. 43-45. 
15  Ibid.,  pp. 31-32. 
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complex but clearly-defined array of tasks and carrying them through to successful 
implementation. 
 
This dominant aspect of Habibie-the-engineer is never more clearly evident than in 
Habibie’s own discussion in his memoirs of his thinking on the eve of the presidency 
being thrust upon him.  Here he treats us to a brief but telling analysis of the 
constraints imposed on social and political freedoms by his two predecessors, 
essentially excusing them on the grounds that Indonesians, ground under by centuries 
of colonialism and exploitation, and with virtually no education, had little capacity but 
to do what they were told.  But, he continues, the world had now changed in such a 
way as to make irrelevant (indeed, highly damaging) that style of rule; “can a feudal 
system and culture , together with the sacral institution of the presidency, still be 
defended?”.16  In an era of growing prosperity, of globalisation, of enhanced 
education and of the free avail lability of knowledge and ideas, that model, Habibie 
reasoned, could no longer work.  In another place, he remark, “top-down government, 
which seems to be strong, always ends in tragedy”.17  The whole is analysed, just like 
airframe cracking, as a purely theoretical and technical problem, which can be solved 
not by incrementalist experimentation but by grasping the nature of the problem in its 
wholeness and complexity and arriving at a suitably logical, theoretically-grounded, 
solution.18 
 
In arriving at theoretically apt solutions to the broad political and social problems he 
confronted in 1998, Habibie was undoubtedly assisted by the fact that, unlike so many 
of his Indonesian contemporaries, he was an internationalist and globalist.  That 
aspect of his make-up was partly a consequence of the fact that he had long belonged 
to the international community of research engineers, having published around fifty 
scientific papers on aircraft engineering and associated matters and had been 
honoured by his scientific peers.19  Partly, too, it came from the fact that his higher 
education and early career were passed in a strongly internationally-oriented and 
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before”, he remarked (Matt Price, “Talks the talk, walks the walk, but …”, The Australian, 27 May 1998). 
19  Andre Priyanto, “B.J. Habibie: ‘Saya telah menyelesaikan my mission impossible;’”, Tempo, 14 January 2001, p. 39. 
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cosmopolitan Western country with vital civil society institutions.20  Whereas much of 
the thrust of Indonesian political thinking both before and after independence has 
been directed inwards, to the attempt to identify and consolidate what is thought to be 
truly indigenous and unique about Indonesia and about being Indonesian, Habibie 
tended to think in terms of international movements and trends with which Indonesia 
must identify and negotiate, rather than (as has so often been the case) 
counterproductively attempt to defend itself from.21  He was acutely aware of the 
importance of the interrelationship between technological advance, globalising 
tendencies, and economic development, especially as they expressed themselves by 
the early 1990s in the collapse of a bipolar world, the importance of the third wave of 
democracy, the soaring importance of global economic interrelationships, and the 
significance of developing movements for enhanced human rights.  Indonesia, for 
Habibie, had to be deeply involved in these globalising impulses rather than 
ambivalent about and fearful of them, in the Indonesian context a change of 
perception of significant proportions given the habitual anxiety and defensiveness in 
Indonesian political leaders in the face of the global. 
 
To take further the argument that Habibie’s approach to politics and its practice is best 
understood as that of engineer and technical manager, and to demonstrate both the 
advantages and significant shortcomings of this approach, I want to discuss four 
major issues to which Habibie himself gives attention in his memoirs, and attempt to 
show how that engineering bent was both stunningly successful in some ways and 
seriously inadequate in others, and that it had the consequence that Habibie’s political 
career was inevitably short-lived—notwithstanding his insistence that he was not just 
a transitional figure and his determination to seek a second term as president.22 
 
Habibie’s analysis of the first of these matters, the events surrounding the fall of 
Suharto and the end of the New Order, Habibie’s rise to the presidency, and the 
immediate problem of transition, provides fascinating insights into this crucial period.  
What I found most compelling was the nature of Suharto’s relationship with Habibie.  
Habibie himself had been at pains in the past to show how close the two were, how 
                                                 
20  Hasyim, “Presiden Republik Indonesia B.J. Habibie”, pp. 15-16. 
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History 52, 2 (2006), pp. 261-71. 
22  Hasyim, “Presiden Republik Indonesia B.J. Habibie”, p. 17 
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they shared thousands of hours of discussion over many years and many subjects, and 
how much Habibie learned from the master politician of Cendana.  In this context, 
Habibie’s treatment and analysis of Suharto’s behaviour around the time of his 
resignation is curious in the extreme and deeply unsatisfactory.  As political pressure 
mounted in the days before he stood down, Suharto publicly humiliated Habibie by 
suggesting that were he to resign as president, Indonesia would perforce be ruled by a 
new president—according to the constitution that had to be Habibie—who was, 
Suharto suggested, incapable of handling the task, something that stung Habibie very 
deeply indeed, since it meant that Suharto had never had any longer-term intention of 
handing Habibie power.23  Subsequently, Suharto appears to have tried to manoeuvre 
Habibie into endorsing a new cabinet, and then requiring him to stand down 
immediately when Suharto himself resigned.  And then, when Suharto finally did step 
aside, he refused to meet with Habibie to explain his motives and purpose, and has 
subsequently had only a short telephone conversation during which he declined to 
clarify his behaviour and made no effort to assist Habibie in his new, complex, 
dangerous range of tasks.  Though we know he was deeply hurt by the experience, 
Habibie’s analytical propensities seem incapable of explaining the dynamics of the 
relationship at this point, and he chooses not to explore the matter in any detail.  In the 
absence of his analysis, we are left to conjecture.  Was Suharto’s behaviour part of a 
larger plan which had as its goal the securing of the presidency for a member of his 
family, perhaps Tutut?  Or perhaps Suharto was simply too old and tired to care any 
more; once he saw that the writing was on the wall for his presidency, perhaps he was 
content simply to walk away, angered, perhaps, by the manner of his forced departure, 
and expecting that the chaos that might have been expected to eventuate might cast 
his own long and dominating rule into a more favourable light and draw a greater 
measure of gratitude from his people.  Whatever the case, Habibie’s silence might 
seem to indicate an incapacity in his rationalist engineering cast of mind to cope with 
a problem whose contours were so uncertain and hidden, whose variables so difficult 
to isolate, whose dimensions so murky and nuanced.  Habibie’s analytical tool-box 
seems incapable of uncovering and sifting what on the surface seems inexplicable 
behaviour. 
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On the second matter, Habibie’s vision for Indonesia, his memoirs present an 
extraordinarily sense of what Habibie hoped and planned for his country.  While his 
presidency was initially derided as a holdover of the New Order, Habibie makes it 
clear that he had long considered the appropriate path for Indonesia at this point in its 
development, a multi-dimensional emancipation aimed at liberating the productive 
qualities of Indonesia’s people in the context of a modern, ever more closely 
interconnected and globalising world.  He demonstrates an acute awareness—
something Suharto himself did not share, at least not with the same acuity and 
urgency—that the developmental success of the New Order, together with the 
changing nature of the world in general, required that the successor regime to the New 
Order be very different from the New Order itself..  For Habibie, the new Indonesia 
had to recognise the fact that the people had grown up, and that they needed a 
democratic regime that was sensitive to the need for openness, transparency, 
efficiency, as well as their human rights.  That was why, Habibie relates, as he 
pondered his future in the early morning hours of 21 May 1998, he concluded that all 
political prisoners had to be released, that freedom of speech, of thought, of the press, 
had to be implemented, and properly democratic elections be staged.24 
 
This vision is startling in its range, its elegance, its complexity, and its grasp of global 
trends, and demonstrates compellingly Habibie’s engineering approach to problem-
solving.  Once the problem had been identified, isolated, and clarified, its dimensions 
assessed, its variables (and their contexts) measured, Habibie moves to the 
appropriate theoretical solution.  There is no need for teams of researchers, for focus 
groups, for long debate, for pilot studies, for incremental experimentation, or even for 
further discussion.  The theoretical problem has its corresponding theoretical (and 
thus real and accurate) solution.  And it comes from inner deliberation and conviction, 
not, as Hermawan Sulistyo suggested, in reactive and half-hearted response to 
political pressures brought to bear upon Habibie within and outside the country.25  But 
from this discussion, some nagging problems arise.  Chief amongst them, of course, if 
why Habibie did not more actively advance this vision when he was a senior member 
of numerous successive Suharto governments, and then vice-president (in this context, 
it is difficult to believe that he had never received any report, “from either inside or 
                                                 
24 Habibie, Detik-detik yang menentukan, pp. 57-58. 
25 Sudarsono, Noorca M. Massardi, et al., “Plus-minus rapor setahun Habibie”, Forum Keadilan, 23 May 1999, p. 77. 
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outside the country”, of human rights abuses in East Timor).26  Was it that reform on 
this inventive scale was simply unthinkable within the constraining confines of the 
New Order? Was it that Habibie thought it likely that an aging and increasingly 
suspicious and irascible Suharto would not only oppose such thinking but strike out at 
its author?  If so, was Habibie simply biding his time in the expectation that the 
presidency, and thus the authority to implement his grand vision, would ultimately be 
his?  Or was it perhaps (although this seems much less likely) that Habibie did not 
attempt to systematise this new vision until the demands of being president forced 
him to do so?  More broadly, why was it Habibie so successfully concealed these 
elements of his social and political thinking for so long?  Habibie’s silence on the 
matter of his long period of political quiescence during his decades as minister and 
senior figure in the New Order suggests other strands of his engineering cast of mind, 
those of relevance and pragmatism.  In the context of Suharto’s political dominance, 
the most appropriate response was not to exit, and even less to oppose, but to work 
within the narrow confines of the regime for limited, attainable and worthwhile 
objectives.  In other words, Habibie’s response was to manage, and await another time 
when a more expansive agenda had more realistic chance of success.  Put in the most 
simple words, Habibie’s sense of his task was limited to Suharto’s definition of it, and 
until Suharto was gone Habibie had neither the enthusiasm nor opportunity for 
advancing a more globally-aware and humane agenda for his country.  He just did his 
job, the task allocated for him, and remained within its contours. 
 
Third, the issue of East Timor.  Australians, especially, have long wondered at 
Habibie’s motives in so radically re-orienting Indonesian policy towards East Timor, 
not always kindly.  Some speculated that Habibie offered the East Timorese a chance 
for a “popular consultation” in the expectation that the opportunity for independence 
would be rejected.  In this view, such a tactic might allow the East Timorese 
“problem” simply to fade away, at the same time satisfying an increasingly critical 
world opinion of Indonesia’s good intentions and providing Habibie with enhanced 
domestic popularity.  Others thought that Habibie wanted both to demonstrate and 
assert his political independence both from the New Order regime and from the 
military, and that East Timor was the sacrificial lamb in that endeavour.   
                                                 
26 Habibie, Detik-detik yang menentukan, p. 250. 
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According to Habibie’s account, however, the reason for his decision is both simpler 
and more compelling than the more Machiavellian and conspiratorial explanations 
sometimes advanced.  For Habibie, the East Timor problem required solution, 
especially in the context of the need to curry international support and aid for his 
country at a time of national economic crisis.  There was a sharp sense of realism 
here, for although “we had a history of 22 years of togetherness with the people of 
East Timor, it was clearly not sufficient for the people of East Timor to unite with 
us”.27  Neither had the international community shown much propensity to provide 
the recognition of East Timor’s annexation that the Indonesian government had 
always longed.  Further, East Timor was a distraction from the much more significant 
problems that Indonesia faced at that time.  Finally, he notes, and accurately in my 
view, that the problem needed a more or less immediate resolution.  The kind of 
advice proffered by Australian Prime Minister John Howard late in 1998—a long 
period of preparation in a state of advanced autonomy before the holding of a 
definitive referendum—faced a number of strategic problems.  First, it assumed that 
Indonesia’s position vis-à-vis East Timor was a colonial one, an unacceptable 
understanding of the issue in Indonesian eyes.  Second, simply delaying a referendum 
until a much later time meant that the issue would continue to smoulder away, 
distracting Indonesia from its more immediate and pressing problems, and causing 
gathering global disapprobation.  In the event, of course, East Timor was “lost” to 
Indonesia, a significant but not permanent or disabling blow to its self-esteem, and 
one which, I suspect, especially given recent events in that new country, has not been 
the cause of much deep regret.  The striking thing in all of this, of course, is that 
Habibie did what had for decades appeared unthinkable—he provided the East 
Timorese with the opportunity to determine their political future.  He did it, as well, 
with little appreciation of the associated political difficulties nor what the political 
consequences might be for his own long-term political career.  He was, of course, 
thinking of the problem in engineering style:  he explored the problem and its context, 
found the theoretically appropriate and rational solution, and moved with astounding 
rapidity implement his thinking (One might suggest, indeed, that the inability of 
Indonesia’s domestic and military elite to do much to oppose him was in large 
                                                 
27  Ibid., p. 236. 
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measure a consequence of the very audacity and speed of his move).  It is difficult any 
other Indonesian figure at that moment who might have had the capacity to think and 
act in these terms. 
 
Finally, I move to the matter of Habibie’s departure from politics.  Notwithstanding 
the significance of his achievements during his brief presidency, Habibie always 
attracted very significant opposition.  Partly this was a consequence of his long 
connectedness with Suharto and the special place and privileges he had enjoyed 
within the New Order scheme of things.  This made it difficult for champions of 
reformasi to accept him as a genuine agent of change and reform, just as it made 
enemies of those who feared that he might dismantle the privileges and processes 
associated with the old style of New Order politics.  Within Indonesia’s complex 
political constellation, he remained an essential outsider, not happy with nor 
particularly skilled in the rough-and-tumble of competitive and usually highly cynical 
politics, and not able or willing to compete successfully with those whose only life 
was politics and power.  Political solutions were, for him, more often black and white 
than grey, and the messy problems of political negotiation and horse-trading seemed 
often to him to be a wasteful diversion from the solution of more practical and 
pressing problems.  This meant, in the end, that his accountability speech was 
narrowly rejected (by 33 votes) by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat in October 
1999; indeed, he is at pains to point out in his memoirs that his political competitors 
had decided before the speech was even presented that they would reject it, whatever 
its content might prove to be.28  And so it was rejected, not on its merits, but because 
of who Habibie was, and because his unexpected success in engineering political 
change placed him in the sights of others with their own ambitions and who found 
him an unexpected and irritating political obstacle.  Tellingly, as in the case of his 
strained relationship with Suharto, Habibie provides us with no reasoned analysis of 
the dimensions of the problem he faced nor what he made of it.  There is no clear 
sense either of the opposition he faced—what, for example, are we to make of the 
Bali Bank scandal and its repercussions?—and the grounds upon which it was based, 
nor whether and to what extent Habibie himself might have been prepared to practise 
the politics of intrigue in an attempt to secure the acceptance of his record.  There is, 
                                                 
28  See, for example, Khoirul Rosyadi, “Amien Rais: ‘No Megawati, no Habibie’”, Forum Keadilan, 22 August 1999, p. 24. 
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in his account, a certain political aloofness and a sense of inevitability that he would 
face defeat, but a sense as well that what he had done had been right and proper, and 
that he would be faithful to his vision whatever the real-world consequences for his 
future.  It is as though his great skills of engineering and management were 
inadequate to cope with the uncertainties and even apparent irrationalities of 
politicking in the raw.  Habibie was happiest in dealing with problems, even deeply 
complex, interconnected and highly detailed, and much less comfortable in plotting 
solutions where the variables—especially other political actors—were so uncertain, so 
ill-defined, so unpredictable in their action. 
 
Given the rejection of his accountability speech, Habibie had no option but to 
withdraw his candidacy for the presidency.  That he could do so with such equanimity 
and grace (something other departing Indonesian presidents have found difficult to 
summon when their time came to leave) says much for the quality of his leadership 
and the ideals he sought to implement, just as it indicates again his manner of 
interpreting the world.  It demonstrates (despite his claim to “understand politics”)29 
the incapacity of his turn of mind to cope with the infuriating, highly irritating, often 
debilitating and imperfect world of the political.  And it reminds us, as well, that 
Habibie was eccentric, unusual, not cast in a common mould.  He had a life—a rich 
intellectual and family life—which helped him put politics in its proper perspective;  
he was not one who lived solely for the practices, privileges and accoutrements of 
political power, and he could recognise it for the vain mistress that it is. 
 
Habibie led Indonesia at the crucial time when Indonesia began to realign itself in 
fundamental ways—the “decisive moment”, as he put it to me, when “Indonesia was 
at the cross road to go through a revolution and civil war becoming ‘Balkanise[d]’ or 
through an accelerated evolution become a democratic society”.30  Inevitably, his own 
articulation of the significance of his leadership and of his accomplishments will be 
read and interpreted against the autobiographies of his immediate presidential 
predecessors, Sukarno31 and Suharto.32  Both those accounts are very different in kind 
from that of Habibie.  Sukarno’s reminiscences are a grand, resounding, unnuanced 
                                                 
29  Email message from B.J. Habibie, 25 July 2006. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Sukarno, An autobiography as told to Cindy Adams (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). 
32  Soeharto, Pikiran. 
 15
and self-celebrating hymn to Indonesian independence, of which Indonesia’s first 
president sees himself as both missionary and embodied manifestation.  The second is 
a mean-spirited if equally self-congratulatory account of the triumph of gritty, wholly-
independent determination against a widely-ranged array of destructive and 
potentially deadly foes.  Habibie’s memories share something of the apologist tone of 
Suharto’s book, a defence against seen and unseen enemies, but little of the vanity of 
Sukarno’s effort.  Unfortunately, like both of these giants, Habibie’s efforts to portray 
himself in the best possible light is somewhat self-defeating.  Like both Sukarno and 
Suharto, Habibie wants to demonstrate his command of the political heights, which 
means that when problems challenge, the answer is immediately, seamlessly, and 
almost effortlessly available.  That reflects, however, not the conceit of Sukarno nor 
the smugness of Suharto, but rather Habibie’s self-consciously formidable 
engineering mind, with its emphasis or order, process, and management, and his 
driving sense that all real problems have real solutions. 
 
Accordingly, Habibie’s memoirs lack for human warmth, connectedness and 
collaboration.  Like his predecessors, he presents his work essentially as a singular, 
lonely project.  While not so overweeningly self-centred as Suharto’s Pikiran, where 
no other persons are allowed even the smallest part on the stage except as loyal 
minions or combatants to be vanquished, Habibie’s story is essentially that of the 
solitary individual, conducting what he calls an “inner dialogue” with himself (but 
only himself) as he seeks to make sense of the course of events and to divine the way 
forward.  But because of the account’s disciplined orderliness, we learn little of the 
inner struggles of that individual—the stresses generated by massive responsibility, 
the effects on everyday life and relationships, the role played by loved ones, the 
frustration that comes of impotence when one cannot get one’s way, the battles within 
oneself to push on for solutions when all seems so dark and threatening, and when all 
about if opposition and thanklessness.  In real life, issues do not present themselves 
with their dimensions and implications immediately self-evident, answers need 
sometimes to be agonisingly and only partially arrived at, crises need to be contained 
rather than immediately resolved, success is often partial and fleeting, failure and 
defeat in different degree are an inevitable part of the political game.  In presenting 
himself as omniscient, organised, prepared, pragmatic, and as highly rational, almost 
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robotic (“Believing is good, but checking is better”),33 Habibie’s reflections do 
himself a serious disservice because they remove the human calculus, the capacity for 
error in thought and judgment, the recognition that individual human capacity is 
limited and that it needs the help of others, the emotion and anger that sometimes 
overtake rationality, the temptations and pitfalls of pride and overconfidence—in 
other words, the weaknesses that we all share, some at greater depths and with greater 
consequences than others. 
 
In presenting himself, once he donned the robes of office, of having so clear and 
immediate a vision, and as resolving issues with the conciseness, efficiency, logic and 
far-sightedness presented here, Habibie portrays himself as the technical manager par 
excellence.  “I had to make many unpopular irreversible and/or reversible decisions 
… The decision must be fast and done with calculated risk”.34  While this style of 
operation underlines Habibie’s engineering/managerial cast of mind (“The president 
of Indonesia must … [be] a visionary, not a dreamer … he must be a do-er …. I think 
I am a doer”),35 and makes it clear why his enemies were so keen to see the end of 
him, it paradoxically diminishes and underestimates his real human and political 
achievements.  More important, perhaps, it helps us to understand better why he failed 
to secure the second term as president he so desperately sought.  His success was hard 
won, in the face of very considerable opposition, and his achievements only slightly 
and even then grudgingly conceded.  He made much capital of the fact that “most of 
the people underestimated me and know that I was never really interested in politics, 
but only in policy making”,36 often keeping his startled opponents on the back foot as 
he worked and strove, pushing, in the face of continual disappointments, failures, 
back-stabbing, and recriminations, all for the sake of that larger vision.  But that style 
of divination from above, of self-generated, rapidly-imposed and coldly logical 
solutions, could last only so long, in this case just seventeen months, before the 
complexities and quagmires of politicking asserted its paramountcy.  Habibie was 
unwilling and unequipped to play in that field.  Its rules and protocols were so 
different from those of his chosen profession; he was ill at ease with and confused by 
its indeterminacy, its lack of definition, its need for continually and renegotiated 
                                                 
33  Email message from B.J. Habibie, 25 July 2006. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Tim Wartawan Forum, “Prof. Dr. Ing. Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie”, p. 88. 
36  Email message from B.J. Habibie, 25 July 2006. 
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consensus, its rapidly shifting variables, its shifting boundaries, its irrational 
compromises, its privileging of the short-term, its tolerance of the venal and 
incompetent, its wasteful demands on time and mental energy, and its deployment of 
the non-systematic.  That practical incapacity, the other side of the coin of Habibie’s 
engineering intelligence where clarity of goal, command of the complexities of 
context, and orderliness of process were the consuming values, cost him his 
presidency. 
 
In retrospect, though, Indonesia needed a person with just such gifts at just this time.  
The country was fortunate in the extreme that a man of his technical and managerial 
capacity, cosmopolitanism, intellectual depth, thoroughgoing rationality, and 
confidence in his mastery of theory—and his signal lack of pure political ambition—
came to the presidency, almost by accident.  It is doubtful (especially given the sorry 
experiences of his two immediate successors) that any other Indonesian leader at that 
time had the intellectual vision and gifts to re-engineer Indonesia in the manner 
required, much less the intellectual skills and disciplined character to implement that 
vision.  The result was an astounding series of reforms that had been simply 
unthinkable even a few months before.  Those reforms could not have been achieved 
then or even later by virtue of the wearying politics of experimentation and reaction 
and the popular consensus.  Though they were demanded from without, they were 
engineered from within, rapidly, effectively and, as it turned out for their champion’s 
political hopes, suicidally.  For Indonesia, Habibie was a happy accident. 
